The Battle Over Birthright Citizenship: History, Legal Precedents, and the 14th Amendment

Raul Delapena Setiawan - Saturday, November 21, 2026 | 18:18
Open Passport
The Battle Over Birthright Citizenship: History, Legal Precedents, and the 14th Amendment

As the political season heats up once again, long-settled questions regarding the fundamental right to birthright citizenship have re-entered the national spotlight. Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, has proposed utilizing an executive order on his very first day in office to revoke birthright citizenship for the future children of undocumented immigrants. However, legal advisors and political allies of the former candidate have advocated for policies that would go significantly further, seeking to deny birthright citizenship to all children born to non-citizens altogether. Critics and constitutional scholars note that such sweeping measures would fundamentally undermine the core premise of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly establishes that citizenship is granted to "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

This profound question strikes at the very heart of what it means to be an American. Proposals designed to limit or dismantle birthright citizenship run counter to more than 125 years of established legal practice and common tradition, which trace their roots back to the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, fundamentally, to the founding of the nation itself. Despite this rich legal history, recent years have witnessed the growth of a coordinated public policy infrastructure aimed at redefining and sharply restricting birthright citizenship. This movement has largely developed in response to rising rates of both legal and unauthorized immigration.

The most extreme voices in this debate argue that neither the children of undocumented immigrants nor the children of legal immigrants who have not yet naturalized possess a rightful claim to birthright citizenship. Advocates of this restrictive viewpoint further insist that stripping birthright citizenship from these targeted groups can be achieved swiftly through executive action or simple federal legislation, bypassing the rigorous constitutional amendment process entirely. Given the anticipated prominence of this debate in the coming months, an examination of the historical, legal, and constitutional contexts provides essential clarity on the questions most likely to dominate the national conversation.

The 14th Amendment

Why was the 14th Amendment necessary in the first place?

Although birthright citizenship had been a prevailing practice in the United States since its founding, it historically excluded specific classes of people, most notably Native Americans and enslaved Africans. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s infamous 1857 ruling in the Dred Scott decision escalated this exclusion significantly by denying citizenship to all people of African descent, regardless of whether they were enslaved or free, and regardless of whether they lived in slave states, free states, or federal territories.

This sweeping judicial decision helped trigger the American Civil War, the deadliest conflict in United States history. In the war’s aftermath, a determined Congress sought to ensure that newly emancipated Black Americans could not be stripped of their fundamental rights by former Confederate states. Lawmakers were equally resolved to guarantee that African Americans maintained an unalienable right to citizenship no matter where they resided in the country, effectively overturning the Dred Scott ruling once and for all.

When Congress approved the 14th Amendment, did members intend for its protections to extend solely to former slaves and other individuals of African descent?

Congress approved and the states subsequently ratified the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—within the span of five years following the end of the Civil War. These historic measures were designed to directly address and correct specific injustices suffered by African Americans. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery throughout the United States, while the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed that neither the federal government nor any state could deny citizens the right to vote on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

The Fourteenth Amendment, however, proved to be the most complex and far-reaching of the Reconstruction amendments. Notably, it makes no explicit reference to either slavery or race. Instead, its text dictates clearly: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." The U.S. Senate engaged in extensive, detailed debates regarding the precise meaning of "citizenship" within the amendment. The historical record of these debates and their ultimate resolution demonstrates that the language deliberately conferred birthright citizenship upon virtually all individuals born on U.S. soil, subject only to a few minor and well-defined exceptions.

Opponents of birthright citizenship for the children of non-naturalized immigrants focus on the phrase "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" as a disqualifier for children born to parents who lacked legal status at the time of birth. What about parents who are legally in the United States? Would the phrase exclude their children as well?

While many everyday citizens harbor reservations about automatic citizenship for children born on American soil to undocumented parents, the organized political movement working to restrict birthright citizenship goes much further. The principal architects of this restrictionist legal strategy argue that eligibility for birthright citizenship should be restricted exclusively to the children of native-born Americans and naturalized immigrants.

Under this radical interpretation, authorities would exclude children born to lawful permanent residents of the United States, as well as those born to temporary foreign workers, international students, and other individuals who have not yet completed the formal process of becoming full U.S. citizens. Their central legal theory is that non-naturalized residents are not subject to the complete "political jurisdiction" of the United States, but rather remain bound merely by a partial "territorial jurisdiction."

But what did the authors of the amendment mean by "subject to its jurisdiction"? Whom did they intend to exclude?

The congressional debates surrounding the amendment were extensive and occasionally contentious, focusing primarily on three distinct categories of people: the children of foreign diplomats born inside the United States, Native Americans, and certain foreign immigrant groups.

Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, a prominent sponsor of the amendment whose proposed language ultimately became the final text of the opening sentence of Section 1, directly addressed the scope of these exclusions. When asked what limitations the term "subject to the jurisdiction" implied, Senator Howard responded that the question of citizenship had already been thoroughly discussed by the body and required little further elaboration.

Howard stated that his proposed amendment served as a straightforward declaration of existing national law: that every person born within the territorial limits of the United States and subject to its jurisdiction was a citizen by virtue of both natural and national law. He clarified that this provision would naturally exclude the children of foreign diplomats, ambassadors, or ministers accredited to the United States government, but emphasized that it would successfully encompass every other class of people, thereby resolving the broader question of citizenship once and for all.

Why did the amendment exclude Native Americans?

Native Americans did not achieve full citizenship rights, including the right to vote, until the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. The historical relationship between the federal government and Native American tribes was defined by conflict, discrimination, and active warfare.

During the period leading up to and including the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the vast majority of Native Americans were legally regarded as citizens of independent, sovereign nations with which the United States maintained treaty relations or engaged in open hostilities. Throughout the nineteenth century, a series of armed conflicts unfolded between the federal government and various tribal nations. By 1866, the United States had signed treaties with five major tribes in the region known as the Oklahoma territories, under which the tribes formally agreed to abolish slavery and extend rights to formerly enslaved Black individuals and their descendants.

What about the children of immigrants who were living in the United States at the time the amendment was passed? Were they considered citizens by birth?

During the congressional debates, several senators suggested that other groups should also be excluded from citizenship guarantees, including Chinese nationals, nomadic populations, and other groups described through overt xenophobic rhetoric. Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania expressed anxiety that California might face an influx of foreign populations or individuals with radically different cultures, religions, traditions, and loyalties, questioning whether the people of California possessed the sovereign right to protect themselves through legislative barriers.

In stark contrast, Senator John Conness of California—himself an immigrant born in Ireland who represented his adopted state—delivered a passionate and sharply worded rebuke of Cowan’s nativist fears. Conness defended the inclusion of children born to foreign parents on American soil, including Chinese families in California, arguing that denying basic civil rights, equal protection, and fair treatment to human beings born within the nation’s borders defied all reason and basic humanity.

Did the drafters of the amendment foresee a large number of children born to non-citizen parents, or did they view it simply as a minor demographic factor?

The nineteenth century experienced large-scale immigration to the United States, which routinely triggered significant political backlashes. A powerful nativist movement shook the political landscape during the 1850s, led by the Know Nothing Party, which achieved notable electoral victories at the local, state, and national levels.

By the time the 1860 census was conducted, more than 13 percent of the total U.S. population was foreign-born—a proportion remarkably close to modern figures. The senators debating the Fourteenth Amendment were acutely aware of these profound demographic shifts. Yet, not a single lawmaker suggested that only children whose parents had completed the formal naturalization process should be eligible for birthright citizenship. Furthermore, naturalization was not a common custom for many immigrants at the time, particularly married women. The nineteenth-century naturalization process lacked modern federal supervision, uniform standards, and centralized record-keeping. Consequently, insisting that only children of naturalized parents deserved citizenship would have been entirely impractical for the lawmakers framing the amendment.

What about children born to parents residing unlawfully in the United States? At the time the 14th Amendment was adopted, were the immigrants whose children received automatic citizenship exclusively legal?

The specific legal category of "illegal immigrants" was largely foreign to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. At that time, the United States operated under a system of effectively open borders, maintaining minimal restrictions on who could immigrate—barring primarily criminals, individuals engaged in prostitution, and certain people with severe physical or mental illnesses. Even these limited restrictions were enforced unevenly until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

Following the Civil War, several individual states attempted to enact local restrictions on immigration within their borders, but the Supreme Court struck down these state laws in 1875. In the landmark case Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court ruled that the regulation of foreign citizens entering American ports belonged exclusively to Congress rather than individual states.

Despite this ruling, political animosity toward specific immigrant groups persisted, driving the federal government to assume direct control over immigration policy. Shortly after the Chy Lung decision, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, marking the first major federal legislation explicitly prohibiting immigration from a specific nationality. This was followed by the Immigration Act of 1882, which introduced a federal head tax, established an administrative immigration bureaucracy, and authorized the formal exclusion of targeted classes of travelers.

Have the courts ever addressed how birthright citizenship applies to the children of unauthorized immigrants?

The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the direct question of birthright citizenship for the children of foreign nationals in the 1898 case United States v. Wong Kim Ark. Wong was born in San Francisco in 1873 to parents who had immigrated from China and established lawful residence in the city. Following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act and a severe escalation of anti-Chinese sentiment, Wong’s parents returned to China in 1890, accompanied temporarily by their teenage son, who returned to live in California later that same year.

In 1895, after visiting his parents abroad, Wong was denied re-entry into the port of San Francisco, sparking a high-stakes, three-year legal battle to affirm his constitutional right to American citizenship. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that regardless of his parents’ temporary absence, their foreign citizenship, or his Chinese ancestry, a child born to parents domiciled within the United States "becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States."

Addressing the argument that children of non-naturalized immigrants remain subjects of a foreign power and therefore cannot claim birthright citizenship, the Court acknowledged that Wong’s parents were subjects of the Emperor of China and were legally barred from naturalizing under prevailing federal acts and treaties. Nevertheless, the majority opinion firmly concluded that such external facts "cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution: ‘All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.’"

Has the Supreme Court ever revisited the Wong Kim Ark decision?

The high court has never overturned or formally re-examined the core legal findings and reasoning established in Wong Kim Ark. However, conservative legal scholars and prominent critics of birthright citizenship, such as John Eastman of the Claremont Institute, have periodically urged the judiciary to reconsider the doctrine.

In the 2004 case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which centered on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights rather than birthright citizenship directly, Eastman filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that Yaser Esam Hamdi—an American-born citizen captured while fighting for enemy forces in Afghanistan—was not a lawful U.S. citizen because his parents held temporary work visas at the time of his birth. Notably, no member of the Supreme Court, including justices who ruled against granting Hamdi immediate access to civilian courts, questioned his foundational status as a citizen by birth. Justice Antonin Scalia explicitly referred to Hamdi in his opinion as a "presumed American citizen."

Is there any legal path for opponents to alter the guarantee of birthright citizenship?

Under current constitutional law, the only definitive ways to alter birthright citizenship are through a formal constitutional amendment or by successfully persuading the Supreme Court to overturn decades of established precedent. While various lawmakers have repeatedly introduced federal bills aiming to strip automatic citizenship from the children of undocumented immigrants, these legislative efforts have consistently stalled because legal experts agree they would not survive constitutional review.

Ironically, policy analysts note that unilaterally revoking birthright citizenship would instantly expand the undocumented population in the United States, adding millions of individuals to the rolls of unauthorized residents. While modifying birthright citizenship remains theoretically possible through a constitutional amendment—requiring a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures—such a move would fundamentally transform the legal and philosophical identity of the nation.

Source : Open Passport
Author : Raul Delapena Setiawan
Editor : Open Passport Editorial Team

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